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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
REAL PROPERTY-UNMARKETABILITY OF TITLE AS RIGHT TO
CANCEL CONTRAT.-Plaintiff agreed to purchase certain real prop-
erty from defendant's testator, for the purpose of erecting a factory
thereon. The contract provided that title should be taken subject to
the possible incumbrances shown on a map; that if two streets were
legally opened by the city, there would be a slight variance of the
exterior boundaries. The seller failed, however, to disclose that there
was the possibility of a third street being opened, which would cut
the property substantially in half and thereby render it valueless for
the contemplated purpose. Plaintiff rejected title on the ground
that the danger of the street being opened constituted an incum-
brance, the failure to disclose which amounted to a misrepresenta-
tion. Held, The rejection of title as unmarketable was proper
despite the fact that the map was cancelled by the time of trial.
Junius Construction Co. v. Cohen., 257 N. Y. 393, 178 N. E. 672
(1931).
The threatened restriction of the use to which real property
can be put due to a city ordinance" is an incumbrance 2 rendering
the title to the property unmarketable 3 and allowing vendee to be
relieved of his bargain to buy the property.4 Evidence to show al-
tered financial conditions and loss of value because of delay is ad-
missible to deter a court from enforcing the contract, although the
defect has been eradicated subsequently. 5 In such a case, it is en-
tirely a matter of discretion as to whether or not specific performance
should be granted.6 For misrepresentation alone, the plaintiff has
a valid cause of action,7 whether such misrepresentation was inno-
cent or deceitful.8 In the instant case, there may not have been a
duty for the defendant to speak at all,9 but having mentioned the
'Map filed here subsequent to GENERAL CITY LAW §26 (L. 1926, c. 690),
GREATER NEW YORK CHARTER §442 (amended L. 1917 c. 632), and GENERAL
CITY LAW (Consol. L. c. 21 art. 3).
'Forster v. Scott, 136 N. Y. 577, 32 N. E. 976 (1893); Anderson v.
Steinway, 178 App. Div. 507, 168 N. Y. Supp. 608 (1st Dept. 1917) ; 3 WASH-
BURN, REAL PROPERTY (4th ed., 1856) 659.
'Burwell v. Johnson, 9 N. Y. 535 (1854); Wetmore v. Bruce 118 N. Y.
319, 23 N. E. 303 (1890).
'Stokes v. Johnson, 57 N. Y. 673 (1874); Irving v. Campbell, 121 N. Y.
353, 24 N. E. 821 (1890) ; Holly v. Hirsch, 135 N. Y. 590, 32 N. E. 709 (1892);
Heller v. Cohen, 154 N. Y. 306, 48 N. E. 527 (1897).
5 Haffey v. Lynch, 143 N. Y. 241, 38 N. E. 298 (1894).
' Willard v. Tayloe, 75 Wall. 557 (U. S. 1869); Gotthelf v. Stranahan,
138 N. Y. 345, 34 N. E. 286 (1893); McPherson v. Schade, 149 N. Y. 16,
43 N. E. 527 (1896).
'Allerton v. Allerton, 50 N. Y. 670 (1872); Bloomquist v. Farson, 222
N. Y. 375, 118 N. E. 855 (1918).
8 Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. A. B. Leach & Co., 247 N. Y. 1, 159 N. E.
700 (1928) ; Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931).
This depends on whether or not the concealment by silence is for the
purpose of cheating the other party. WALSH, EQurrY (1930) §108.
RECENT DECISIONS
possibility of opening two streets which would not have altered
the property materially, he could not in good faith conceal the in-
cumbrance of the third street.
F. S. H.
TRUSTS-BANKS-PURCIIASE OF ORDER TO BE CABLED DOES
NOT GIVE RISE TO PREFERRED CLAIM ON INSOLVENCY OF BANK
BEFORE PAYMENT.--Petitioner deposited a sum of money with a
bank in New York to be cabled to a third party in Havana. The
bank mingled the money with its own, sent a cable order to its
Havana correspondent and credited the amount to the latter's agency
in New York. At the request of the third party the cable order was
cancelled but before the communication reached the bank the latter
was taken over by the superintendent of banks for the purpose of
liquidation. Petitioner sought to impress a trust for the amount so
deposited. Held, The relation of debtor and creditor existed. There
was no identification of a particular fund, hence the claim could not
be preferred. Matter of Littman, 258 N. Y. 468, 180 N. E. 174
(1932).
Before a claim can be allowed as preferred against an insol-
vent bank it must be established that it is a trust fund.' In order
to establish a trust relationship rather than one of debtor and
creditor it is necessary to show that a special and not a general de-
posit was made. The essence of a special deposit is that the bank
has custody of it for some special purpose only and no authority
to use it as in a general deposit where the fund may be mingled with
its own and disposed of at the will of the bank. While even in the
case of a special deposit the identical money is not returned, neverthe-
less the bank is limited in the number of uses to which it can put the
money so deposited. 2 It has been held that where a bank has issued
a draft and before payment, failed, there is no preferred claim but
the relation of debtor and creditor exists. 3 The money so paid be-
comes the bank's money and it is a transaction of purchase and sale.4
The issuance of a certificate of deposit also creates a debtor and credi-
'Chetopa State Bank v. Farmers' and Merchants' State Bank, 114 Kan.
463, 218 Pac. 1000 (1923).
'Anderson v. Pacific Bank, 112 Cal. 598, 44 Pac. 1063 (1896); People v.
California Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 23 Cal. App. 199, 137 Pac. 1111
(1913) ; Butcher v. Butler, 130 Mo. App. 61, 114 S. W. 564 (1908).
'Ligniti v. Mechanics and Metals National Bank, 230 N. Y. 415, 130 N. E.
597, 16 A. L. Pt 185 (1921); Clark v. Toronto Bank, 72 Kan. 1, 82 Pac. 582
(1905); Spiroplos v. Scandinavian American Bank, 116 Wash. 491, 199 Pac.
997, 16 A. L. F. 181; see, also, Note, 16 A. L. R. 190.
'Ligniti v. Mechanics and Metals National Bank, supra note 3.
